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ABSTRACT
When people try to obtain a desired event and this outcome occurs independently of their be-
havior, they often think that they are controlling its occurrence. This is known as the illusion
of control, and it is the basis for most superstitions and pseudosciences. However, most ex-
periments demonstrating this effect had been conducted many years ago and almost always
in the controlled environment of the psychology laboratory and with psychology students as
subjects. Here, we explore the generality of this effect and show that it is still today a robust
phenomenon that can be observed even in the context of a very simple computer program
that users try to control (and believe that they are controlling) over the Internet. Understand-
ing how robust and general this effect is, is a first step towards eradicating irrational and
pseudoscientific thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL refers to the tendencythat people have to believe that desired events
that occur when they are trying to obtain them are
caused by their own behavior.1 Indeed, the exis-
tence of this effect should not be surprising if we
think about the history of humankind and about
the many times that humans have developed su-
perstitious behaviors that made them believe that
they were controlling important events, such as
rain or even their own health. More surprising
should be to know that the illusion of control is still
today a robust phenomenon and that it can be ob-
served even through the Internet.
This illusion can sometimes be adaptive (as
when it protects people from detecting that impor-
tant outcomes are uncontrollable, which in turn
may protect them from depression2,3) but it can also
be quite maladaptive (as when the illusion that a
given ritual controls an illness prevents a patient
from going to the hospital). Thus, it is important to
know whether this is today just a laboratory arte-
fact or is, by contrast, a general and extended effect.
There have been proposed many different ways
to assess the degree of objective contingency (or
control) that exists between a participant’s behavior
and a given outcome. Perhaps the most generally
accepted measurement of contingency is P,4 which
is the difference between the probability of the out-
come occurring when the response is emitted and
the probability of the outcomes occurring when the
response is not emitted. That is, P = p(O|R) –
p(O|noR). When an outcome is uncontrollable both
probabilities are identical and P equals ≥ zero.
Overestimation of control occurs when the out-
come is desired and occurs frequently, or when it is
aversive and occurs rarely.2,5,6
The illusion of control has been demonstrated in a
wide variety of situations.1,2,5,7 For example, Matute3,8
used a very simple computer program that pre-
sented aversive noises. The participants were
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motivated through instructions to terminate the
noises, but the duration of each noise had been pre-
programmed and there was nothing that the partic-
ipants could do to control them. However,
participants did not realize that their responses
were ineffective. According to Matute, participants
kept typing something each time that the noise was
presented and, in consequence, every time that the
noise finished the participants had no way of
knowing that the noise would have also finished if
they had done nothing. When asked at the end of
the experiment to what degree they believed they
had had control over noise termination, they
showed a considerable illusion of control.
And, as previously mentioned, this is true also
for the opposite condition in which the participant
is trying to avoid an unpleasant event by refraining
to perform a given action and the unpleasant event
does not occur or occurs rarely.5 Note that, in this
case, the “no action” is actually another form of ac-
tion, and that, in both cases, the response (whether
active or passive) is followed by a frequent rein-
forcer (or an infrequent aversive event). This is like
people following bizarre rituals or pseudo-therapies
to improve their health: as long as they feel fine,
they will attribute their good health to the ritual
they performed.
Perhaps the simpler explanation that can be pro-
posed to account for superstitious behaviours and
illusions of control is that, because people trying to
obtain something tend to respond as much as they
can, if the outcome is relatively frequent it will gen-
erally tend to occur in the presence of responding.8,9
Therefore, the actual contiguity between response
and outcome is there, even though it is spurious. In-
deed, the results of Matute8 showed that participants
exposed to frequent uncontrollable reinforcers tended
to respond in almost every trial, which increased the
chances that adventitious response-outcome pair-
ings occur. In order to learn that the outcome does
not depend on their behavior participants should
act only in 50% of the trials, so that they could be ex-
posed both to the probability of the outcome occur-
ring when they perform the response as well as to
the probability of the outcome occurring when they
do not respond. However, this is something that
most people are unwilling to test on their own. Just
as most people trying to avoid bad luck by not tak-
ing room number 13 in a hotel would not risk the
more scientific strategy of testing what the probabil-
ity of the outcome would be if they took room 13,
experimental participants do not test by default
what the probability of noise termination would be
if they do nothing. However, when participants are
explicitly requested to respond in 50% of the trials,
they realize that their behavior does not affect the
probability of the outcome.8,10,11 Figure 1 illustrates
this process.
In addition to this explanation based on the sub-
jects’ high tendency to act when they are trying to
obtain something,8 many other different explana-
tions have also been proposed to account for the il-
lusion of control. Most of these explanations
assume that personality and internal variables are
responsible for the effect. These include attribu-
tional styles, locus of control, depression, negativ-
ity, self-efficacy beliefs, response-outcome
expectations, among others.1,2,12,13,14 Most probably,
these theoretical approaches are all partly right and
all of these factors do contribute to some degree to
the development of the illusion of control. The pur-
pose of the present research is not to discriminate
among them. Instead, we believe that what is of
most importance at present is to assess the general-
ity of the effect. 
Despite the apparent robustness of the pub-
lished results on the illusion of control, it is easy to
argue that experimental data on the illusion of
FIG. 1. Simulation of fictitious subjects responding
either in 50% of the trials, p(R) = 0.5, or in every trial,
p(R) = 1. Four different conditions were run: 75–75,
75–25, 25–75, and 25–25 (the first number represents
the probability of the outcome in the presence of re-
sponding; the second number represents the probabil-
ity of the outcome in the absence of responding; the
difference between those two numbers represents the
objective contingency or P). For all conditions, sub-
jects responding with a p(R) = 0.5 produce judgments
that are more similar to the actual contingency than
subjects responding with a p(R) of 1. This result can be
obtained using different implementations of generally
accepted learning models such as, for example, the
Rescorla-Wagner19 model. A simple calculation of the
P contingency index4 produces the same result as
well (for calculation purposes, the high p(R) example
can be set to 0.99999 rather than 1).
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control were somewhat artificial and laboratory-
dependent. As an example, it could well be that the
effect occurred because many of those experiments
were conducted many years ago and made use of
computers and other automated devices with
which the regular student-participant was not fa-
miliar at the time. Today’s college students, who
are used to work with computers at all times,
should not generate the same illusion of control in
such a simple preparation as that used for previ-
ous experiments. Additionally, it is also possible
that, because most participants in previous experi-
ments had been psychology students, the results
might not apply to a more general population. The
purpose of the present research was therefore to
assess whether the illusion of control is still today
a reliable phenomenon and whether it can be ob-
served outside of the psychology laboratory. To
this end we used the Internet as our testing arena
in order to best assess the generality and reliability
of this effect.
METHODS
Participants
Our Internet participants (n = 92) were anony-
mous voluntaries who visited our virtual laboratory
(www.labpsico.com) and decided to take part in the
experiment. In order to comply with ethical guide-
lines for human research through the Internet15 and
to assure that all participants were both anonymous
and voluntary, we decided not to request any per-
sonal data, nor did we use cookies or software to
obtain involuntary information from the partici-
pants. Thus, they are of any age, sex, country, or
other personal conditions. We controlled for the
potential problem of getting noisy data over the
Internet by performing an exact replication with
anonymous and voluntary psychology students that
conducted the experiment in our laboratory (n = 98).
In both cases, the computer program randomly as-
signed each participant to each of the experimental
conditions that we describe below.16,17
Procedure
The procedure replicated a previous study8 ex-
cept that, in order to facilitate its execution over the
Internet, the participants were requested to control
visual images (blue flashes) in the computer screen
rather than noises. All flashes had a fixed duration of
1 second, but there were two types of trials, which
were presented in random order. In 75% of the tri-
als, the flashes were programmed to appear very
rapidly (within 1 second), which means that, in
75% of the trials, the response (or the non-response)
was immediately followed by the occurrence of a
flash. In the other 25% of trials, the flashes did not
appear until 5 seconds had elapsed, which means
that the response—or the nonresponse—was gen-
erally not followed by a flash (or at least not imme-
diately). This was done in this way because a high
probability of reinforcer is known to favor the illu-
sion of control.2,6,12
However, we manipulated the instructions and
the post-experimental assessment questions as a
means to reduce the illusion of control in some of
the conditions. Half of the participants in each loca-
tion were simply requested to control the flashes
that appeared on the screen (this is the standard il-
lusion of control condition); the other half was
warned that they might have no control over the
occurrence of the flashes (presumably, these partic-
ipants should show no illusion of control). Orthog-
onally, half of the participants in each of those
groups was told that their task was to obtain the
flashes (this is the standard illusion of control con-
dition, in which the event that occurs frequently is
the one that the participant is trying to obtain); the
other half was told that their task was to avoid the
occurrence of the flashes (this is the opposite condi-
tion, as if one takes herbs to avoid headaches but
keeps suffering from headaches every three out of
four days).
After 50 trials in which participants tried to con-
trol the flashes, they were asked two successive
questions about the degree of control that they
believed they had had over the flashes. The first
question was neutral; the second one was very
explicitly worded so as to reduce the illusion of
control (Fig. 2). To introduce their response partici-
pants could click any point in a 0–100 rating scale
that was located just below each question. The scale
was anchored at 0 and 100, but numbers 0–100
were visible by moving the mouse through the
scale before clicking.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data were compared using analysis of variance
(ANOVA).
RESULTS
The results are shown in Figure 2. This figure
suggests that the strongest illusion of control was
observed in the laboratory participants that were
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trying to obtain the flashes and that had not been
warned at the start of the experiment that the
flashes might be uncontrollable. However, a
strong illusion of control was observed even
among those who were warned and even when
they responded to the explicit question. Two 2
(Warned vs. Non Warned)  2 (Obtain vs. Avoid)
 2 (Laboratory vs. Internet users) analyses of
variance conducted separately on the responses to
the neutral and the explicit question showed no
main effects or interactions (all p > 0.05), suggest-
ing that all conditions yielded had a similar degree
of illusion of control. Most importantly, under all
conditions did the Laboratory and the Internet
participants show a belief of control that was sig-
nificantly different from 0 (all p < 0.001). This is
important because the actual control that was pos-
sible over the flashes was 0: The flashes were
equally likely to occur regardless of whether or
not the subject responded.
DISCUSSION
Both the laboratory and the Internet participants
developed the illusion that they were controlling
the flashes that were being presented in the com-
puter screen. Interestingly, if this occurs in such a
simple (and irrelevant for survival) situation as the
one we have tested here, it is not strange that it
occurs when people are confronted with more im-
portant life events that occur independently of their
behavior such as, for example, health improve-
ments. Indeed, the most important point that the
present results show is that the tendency to develop
an illusion of control is much stronger than we gen-
erally assume. No matter whether participants were
warned at the start of the experiment that they
might have no control; no matter whether the sec-
ond question that they were asked was explicit
about the possibility that everything had been pre-
programmed. Both laboratory and Internet partici-
pants responded as if they had had a considerable
degree of control over the flashes and were reluc-
tant to accept that the outcome had occurred inde-
pendently of their behavior. If they had tested for
the probability of the outcome in the absence of re-
sponding they would have known that the outcome
was not being produced by their responding. But as
previously mentioned, the problem is that this is
something that people do not test by default.
The fact that the illusion of control is related,
among other things, to a high probability of re-
sponding, suggests that it might be the result of a
good strategy for survival: If there is just a single lit-
tle chance to obtain an important event, people who
persist in responding once and again and again no
matter what others say, do surely have many more
opportunities for survival than those that become
passive and do nothing to obtain what they want.
FIG. 2. Illusion of control shown by Internet and control (laboratory) participants. Groups W were warned at the
start of the experiment that the flashes might be uncontrollable; groups NW were not warned. Groups O tried to
obtain the flashes; groups A tried to avoid them. At the end of the experiment all participants were asked to rate to
what degree they thought they had controlled the flashes (Neutral Question; left panel). Once they responded, they
all were explicitly told that everything might have been preprogrammed and were asked to rate again the degree with
which they, rather than the program, had controlled the flashes (Explicit Question; right panel). Under all conditions,
participants showed a significant illusion of control. An offline version of the computer program used for this experi-
ment, including instructions and test questions, can be downloaded from http://paginaspersonales.deusto.es/
matute/soft/flashes.zip.
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The collateral effect is, of course, that if they re-
spond all the time and reinforcement occurs with
high frequency, then they have no way to know that
the outcome would have occurred with the same
probability if they had not responded: An illusion of
control is therefore quite likely to develop as a sec-
ondary effect. Although the illusion of control is an
irrational belief, it might have evolved as a conse-
quence of a general adaptive strategy. 
But even so, there is no doubt that there are also
many natural conditions in which being able to
reduce the illusion of control might be important
and mental health professionals should be prepared
to reduce these illusions when necessary. As an ex-
ample, it could be quite devastating for a patient to
assume that a given magical herb is controlling an
illness that could be easily cured if the patient went
to the hospital instead of taking the herb. Thus, ana-
lyzing the conditions that can reduce the illusion of
control may often prove important.
Several conditions have been shown to reduce
the illusion of control. For example, a very long
exposure to the uncontrollable outcome reduces
the illusion of control.10 If we had used 500 rather
than 50 trials we probably had been able to reduce
the illusion of control. Also, a very low outcome
probability can reduce the illusion of control.2,6,12
For example, if someone’s health never improves,
sooner or later this person will abandon the super-
stitious rituals. And using very short intertrial in-
tervals is also known to reduce the effect.18
Unfortunately, however, knowing that all these
variables can reduce the illusion of control do not
help us much in reducing the illusion of control
that takes part in every day, natural settings. In
natural superstitious settings there is often no
time for such long exposures; and there is often no
way in which the therapist can manipulate vari-
ables such as the number of trials, the outcome’s
density, or the intertrial intervals. However, there
is at least one variable that is certainly in the ther-
apist’s (and the experimenter’s) side and that can
be used to reduce the illusion of control. This is in-
formation: Informing and explaining people very
explicitly that the only way they have to learn
whether or not they have control is to test both
what happens when they perform the response as
well as what happens when they do not respond,
has been shown to reduce superstitions and illu-
sions of control not only in many laboratory ex-
periments,8,10,11 but most importantly, through the
history of humankind. After all, providing this
type of information is equivalent to showing
people the basic principles of scientific thinking.
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